The bundled model is not able to respond to unnoticed heterogeneity and, above all, does not provide sufficient leverage to test the causal assertion that network flows favour DCAs by disseminating information. I therefore turn to estimating fixed effects, combined with placebo-type tests, estimated for the period 1990-2010. Figure 9 shows the estimates. The left panel corresponds to equation 1 (i.e. the « first concordance » equation). In accordance with the initial results of the grouped model, both the reciprocal degree and the two pathways strongly favour the cooperation of the DCA, and the two estimates are very precise. It is interesting to note that estimates have changed for many tax variables. The average power estimate has tipped signs and is now strongly negative, which is the expectation that mutual power discourages cooperation when trust is low. At the same time, mutual wealth greatly increases cooperation between DCAs, as expected. The estimate for mutual enemies is also significantly positive, suggesting that Dyads are exposed to frequent increasing threats over time, they are more likely to sign DCAs. Nato-pfp membership is also positive and strongly linked to the DCAs.
Overall, the FE model provides estimates that closely match expectations. 1.3 The forms of such cooperation can be defined in a specific way by agreements between the different minstries of the parties. Footnote 13 « Peace, trade and sincere friendship with all nations, » said Thomas Jefferson in his inaugural promise. « The involvement of alliances with no one. » While the United States does not respond to all the problems on the planet, it certainly reacts to many of them. Of the 195 officially recognized countries in the world, 150 military personnel are deployed in the United States. So if there is a hotbed of crisis, there is a very good chance that American troops will be able to deal with a large percentage of them. Fortunately, the most powerful heroes on the planet are usually reserved for larger problems such as containing North Korea, punishing Daesh and trying to bring food to hungry people. However, the common profits tell only part of the story. Even if the demand for cooperation is high, information asymmetries can limit the supply of cooperative institutions. States often lack credible information on the reliability of the other or on the willingness to cooperate instead of exploiting the cooperation of others for unilateral purposes. Footnote 9 Given that DIACs deal with sensitive national security issues, including access to classified information, coordination of defence policies and the dissemination of advanced weapons technologies, these are inherently issues of trust. In addition, states may lack information on each other`s institutional preferences, such as the scope of .B preferred application and the precision of formal agreements leading to distributional conflicts.
Footnote 10 If states are not or are unsure of the types of agreements that others are willing to sign, DCAs` offer remains low.